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This study explores patterns of Arab and Jewish movement and
settlement which have been observable on the West Bank of the Jordan
River since 1967. The first chapter is comprised of pertinent
background information, a statement of purpose, a discussion of
methodology, and justification of the research.
BACKGROUND
The West Bank of the Jordan River is a small parcel of land
consisting of only 5500 square kilometers; nonetheless the area
possesses a tremendous amount of historical and religious signifi-
cance for Israelis and Palestinian Arabs alike. This blend of
historical and religious appeal is potent and explosive. Recently
a third ingredient has been added to the blend; Israelis have argued
that possession of the West Bank is vital to their nation's defense
and security. In the final analysis, the region becomes "the ful-
crum of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the most significant of the
areas conquered by Israel in June 1967 . . . (it) constitutes the
main ground for the struggle between Israeli and Palestinian
nationalism."
Historical Ties
The region is historically significant to both Israelis and
Palestinians. The West Bank highlands represent the heartland of
the Biblical kingdom of Israel and contain that kingdom's capital
at Jerusalem. Throughout the centuries of the Diaspora Jews drew
strength from their memories of and desire to return to the land of
2Israel. There were also a small number of Jewish settlers in the
West Bank just prior to the creation of Israel in 1948. Therefore
a number of Jews believe that historical precedent justifies the
occupation, or "liberation," of the West Bank.
Palestinian Arabs also feel that history mandates their right
to the West Bank. They have seen many conquerors come and go
throughout the centuries, and as a result the blood of the Pal-
estinian Arab is a somewhat confusing blend of Arab, Egyptian,
Hyksos, Hittite, Amorite, Babylonian, Phillistine, and various
European bloods. However, they are also descendants of the ancient
Canaanites. The Palestinian may therefore claim that his/her ances-
tors dwelled in the Land of Canaan (including the West Bank of the
Jordan) long before Moses and the Israelites wandered through the
Sinai in search of the "promised land." By the same token they
farmed West Bank soils for many centuries preceding the Six-Day
War in 1967. A Palestinian farmer may reasonably argue that his
father and his grandfather paid taxes on his land and have since
been laid to rest beneath it; therefore, he would insist, the West
Bank belongs also to his posterity.
A Palestinian Arab state has actually never existed. Between
1950 and 1967 the West Bank was annexed to Jordan and prior to that,
the British held Palestine as a Mandate. In the centuries preceding
British rule the Ottaman Turks governed Palestine's people. Yet the
Palestinians insist the land is theirs because they have dwelled on
it for so long. They believe self-determination should be accorded
to them as it is to other peoples.
3Religious Ties
Religious arguments are also presented to justify claims to
the West Bank. According to the Old Testament all of this land
was promised to Abraham and his descendants as Abraham stood in the
ancient city of Shechem (Nablus) . Jews and Arabs alike believe the
promise applies to them. Both recognize Abraham as the father of
their people, although the Arabs believe they descend from Ishmael,
the son of Abraham's concubine, while the Jews descend from Isaac,
the son of Abraham's wife.
The town of Shechem itself lies on the West Bank, as does the
Biblical city of Jericho. Bethlehem, which is the "City of David"
to Jews and the birthplace of Christ to Palestinian Christians, is
also located in the West Bank. The city of Hebron is another impor-
tant site; it is thought to contain Abraham's grave. It is Juda-
ism's second holiest city and is also of importance to Palestinian
Muslims and Christians. Finally, the ancient City of Jerusalem is
in the West Bank and abutts Israel's eastern border. The Israelis
had built a new Jerusalem on their side of the border prior to the
1967 War, but in 1967 Old and New Jerusalem were "unified." Old
Jerusalem is the holiest city for Jews and the third holiest city
for Palestinian Muslims.* It also has great significance for Arab
Christians as the city in which Jesus was crucified.
Strategic Importance
The government of Israel claims that occupation of the West
Bank makes Israel's borders more defensible. Because Israel is a
small state, Israelis have long felt that its large concentrations
* The holiest city is Mecca, followed by Medina
4of civilian population are frighteningly vulnerable to attack from
nearby Arab states. Before Israel occupied the West Bank, the
width of its territory in the central heartland was only twelve
kilometers. Many Israelis therefore view the West Bank as a
necessary "buffer zone."
The West Bank boasts of several impressive topographical
features which heighten the perception that it is an aid to secu-
rity. The Jordan River consists of a number of entrenched meanders
which could serve as the initial antitank ditch, should the Arabs
attack from the east. The Jordan Rift Valley "would form a for-
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midable topographical barrier." To the west of the Valley lie
rugged mountains; many Israeli officials believe that "relatively
small forces, armed with sophisticated and appropriate weaponry,
could hold the 'wall' even against an Arab army assisted by outside
powers
.
Any passes through the mountains . . . are long and narrow
and could be turned into death traps for advancing armor." For
these reasons, Israel emphasizes the strategic importance of the
West Bank.
Physiography
An understanding of the strategic argument, and of others which
will be presented throughout the course of the paper, is facilitated
by a physiographic description of the West Bank. The area consists
of two physiographic regions
. A humid highland region runs along
Israel's eastern border. It is made up of barren limestone hills
and of fertile basins and valleys. The highlands which stretch to
the north of Jerusalem lie in the area known to Israelis as
5"Samaria," whereas the area to the south of Jerusalem is known as
"Judea." Jerusalem itself perches between the Samarian and Judean
mountain blocks. (Map I)
To the east of the highlands lies a transitional zone known
to Israelis as the wilderness of Judea and Samaria. It is barren
and uncultivated. It in turn adjoins the Jordan Valley, which forms
the second major physiographic region in the West Bank. This is a
rift valley; it is acutally a small segment of the lengthy Syrian-
East African Rift. The entire valley lies in a rainshadow created
by the highlands, and is arid to semiarid. In its northern reaches
annual rainfall averages 300 millimeters, but this amount decreases
to the south and tapers off to only 100 millimeters at the Dead
4Sea. Parts of the Valley offer cultivable soils, while in other
areas the soil is too thin or too saline to be easily utilized.
Population and Economy Prior to Israeli Occupation
It is estimated that nearly one million Arabs resided in the
West Bank before the 1967 War. 758,000 of these resided in the high-
lands and an additional 175,0 00 lived in the Jordan Valley. The
highlands were densely populated and homed urban centers such as
East Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron, Bethlehem, and Pvamallah. The only
major population center in the Valley was Jericho. Arab settlement
in the Valley was dominated by three large refugee camps which
surrounded that city.
Much of the population was employed in agriculture. According
to a Jordanian census taken in 1961, approximately 37.6 percent of
the West Bank labor force was engaged in agriculture. However,














6"this probably underestimates the participation of unpaid family
labor. In addition, much of the activity of the other economic
sectors was centered around agriculture, including the processing
of farm products in the industrial sector, and transport and com-
merce related to farm products. It is therefore no exagerration to
say that agriculture was the dominant sector in the West Bank econo-
7
my." It has been estimated that agriculture provided jobs for
o
about half of the labor force prior to 1967. Also, Israel's Eco-
nomic Planning Authority estimates that it accounted for 24 percent
9
of the gross national product.
The land obviously employed much of the population. However,
between the years 1948 and 1967, little land was added to that which
had been under cultivation in 1948. During this same period the
West Bank received a large influx of refugees and experienced a high
birth rate. West Bank industry was also unable to absorb the in-
crease in population. It remained "small-scale and underdeveloped,"
with only five enterprises which employed 100 or more persons.
Most existing industry was located in Jerusalem.
As a result of this a high rate of unemployment existed, and
many Palestinians responded by leaving the West Bank for the East
Bank or for the oil fields. In early 1967 approximately 120,000
Jordanians were working abroad; most of these were from the West
Bank. According to Israel's Economic Planning Authority, the re-
mittances these workers sent home accounted for 12 percent of the
12West Bank's gross national product. Palestinians also worked in
the East Bank, which was not classified as work "abroad." Therefore
7a significant number of Arabs had left the West Bank to seek employ-
ment elsewhere.
Depopulation
In June of 1967 Israel occupied the West Bank. At this time
many Palestinians fled to Jordan, although estimates concerning the
number of refugees differ. These estimates vary between 182,000
and 355,000 refugees. Due to postwar confusion and displacement,
and to the resultant lack of reliable data, precise and indisputable
estimates are unavailable. An Israeli census conducted after the
14
war stated that 599,000 Arabs remained, though some scholars argue
that this number is low. William Harris claims that 175,000 Arabs
left the highlands and that 75,000 left the Jordan Valley. 5 This
would mean that 23 percent of those in the highlands and 88 percent
of those in the Valley fled. Harris 1 estimates lie between the pro-
posed extremes and while they cannot be verified, they do reveal
two accepted facts: a small number of those in the highlands and
many of those in the Valley left the West Bank.
First, a proportionately small number of highlanders fled. The
mountains therefore remained densely populated. East Jerusalem had
a postwar population of 65,000, Nablus of 44,000, and Hebron of
16
38,000. In addition a majority of the highland farmers remained
on their lands.
In the Valley large numbers of residents fled across the near-
by Jordan River. Most of the Palestinians who had lived in the
refugee camps near Jericho became refugees for a second time; the
camps were virtually emptied. Much of the population of Jericho
also left, and so too did more than 50 percent of the native rural
17population. The Jordan Valley was left sparcely populated.
Harris observed in his text that there existed a "broad contrast
between very heavy population reduction in the Jordan Rift and
certain sections of the western border and substantial population
18
retention in the heart of Judea-Samaria . . . ." This contrast
was evident to the Israeli occupiers as well, and would prove im-
portant in the development of settlement policy.
Finally, it should be noted briefly that the population of the
West Bank continued to show some decline until 1969 due to emigra-
19tion. In 1969 the population leveled out at 584,000, and then
again began to increase. This increase was due to a decrease in
out-migration coupled with the continuation of high birth rates.*
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to examine selected patterns of
population movement and settlement in the West Bank of the Jordan
River since its occupation in 1967. Selected movements of the in-
digenous population, as well as the establishment of Jewish settle-
ments in the region, will be dealt with. The Israeli government
has been highly visible in directing and implementing the patterns
to be discussed, and so the research consistently responds to this
question: How have the policies of Israel's government impacted on
patterns of movement and settlement in the West Bank? Also, how
dominant is this impact, relative to other factors which have con-
tributed to the patterns? What are these other factors? Finally,
what patterns have resulted?
* A much more comprehensive discussion of Arab in-migration, out-
migration, and natural increase will be included in Chapter 4.
JUSTIFICATION
Peter Perry, a geographer at the University of Canterbury,
states that "the geographical dimension of current affairs has too
often been neglected in public debate, at our peril and often by
our default- The missing contribution in otherwise well informed
analysis of the contemporary world ... is almost invariably that
20
of the political geographer." This research is in part a response
to this statement.
The West Bank receives a tremendous amount of international
press. It is an area which seems to be undergoing "de facto" an-
nexation by the Israelis and which is, at the same time, a center-
. piece of Palestinian nationalism. This paper is rooted in the
belief that an improved understanding of the area will be facili-
tated by a discussion of the population of the area, and more
specifically of selected patterns of settlement exhibited by that
population.
Selected patterns of movement and settlement and intensity of
the same will be elucidated; the thesis will also seek insights into
the evolution of the patterns . The patterns themselves represent
a spatial phenomenon. The study of these fits into Pattison's
"spatial tradition" of geographical study.
A discussion of the evolution of the patterns will necessarily
deal with relevant political processes within Israel. Saul B. Cohen
and Lewis D. Rosenthal suggested in the Geographical Review that
"without more attention to the political, our geographical insights
21
are likely to be limited and sterile." This statement rings
10
particularly true in the case of the West Bank, where Israel's
government has indeed played a dominant role. Other important fac-
tors which have impacted upon patterns of movement will also be
discussed. The end result should be a much more thorough under-
standing of the selected spatial phenomena.
METHODOLOGY
Data for the thesis was gathered through an extensive review
of relevant literature and also through use of available statistical
documentation. Among those sources which were most productive was
geographer William W. Harris' text Taking Root: Israeli Settlement
in the West Bank, the Golan and Gaza-Sinai, 1967-1980 . This book
provided many maps illustrating Jewish settlement as well as valu-
able insight into Knesset decisions affecting settlement patterns.
Also of importance was Avshalom Rokach's Rural Settlement in
Israel
,
which discussed the technicalities involved in establishing
a settlement, such as how settlement groups form and what criteria
they must meet, how settlers are selected and trained, and what
factors influence specific settlement location. His text was vir-
tually a handbook on how to establish a rural settlement in Israel
or the occupied territories.
The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics* Quarterly Statistics
of the Administered Territories and its annual Statistical Abstract
of Israel were useful in that they provided quantitative data on
the Arab population, and particularly on the movement of Arab
laborers
.
Ann Lesch's book entitled Israeli Occupation of the West Bank :
The First Two Years dealt with Knesset decision making and with
11
settlement establishment in the early years. She later updated her
study in an article entitled, "Israeli Settlement in the Occupied
Territories, 1967-1977" ( Journal of Palestine Studies ) , which in-
cluded a number of useful maps
.
Among the most valuable journals utilized were Middle East
International and the Journal of Palestine Studies . Middle East
International provided a variety of information in its monthly sec-
tion "News Out of Israel and the Occupied Territories." It also
published Edward Mortimer's "Stealing the West Bank," which aided
in an understanding of how Israel lays claim to West Bank law.
The Journal of Palestine Studies published applicable articles
such as Ibrahim Matar's "Israeli Settlement in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip" which included a number of helpful maps, Selim Tamari's
"Building Other People's Homes" which dealt with Arab labor in
Israel, and Ann Lesch's."
A brief overview of the thesis is pertinent at this point.
First, the settlement of Jews in the West Bank will be discussed.
Chapter 2 will deal with the actual placement of the settlements
and will focus on governmental decision-making. The government
approves or disapproves all settlement plans and plays a dominant
role in settlement distribution. The third chapter will deal with
recruitment and selection of settlers, as well as with economic
bases of the settlements and with settler numbers.
The fourth chapter will examine Arab patterns of movements.
The most striking of these is the daily flow of laborers into Israel
Arab out-migration will also be discussed.
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Chapter 5 will summarize findings after implications, discuss
research constraints, and suggest questions which might be explored
in future research.
The study area includes all of the conquered West Bank with
the exception of East Jerusalem. On June 28, 196 7, Israel formally
annexed East Jerusalem, and its exclusion from this is necessitated
because the government has dealt with it much differently than with
the remainder of the West Bank. Jewish settler activity in and
around East Jerusalem has been more intense, and also less contro-
versial within Israel, than has been settler activity in the remain-
der of the territory. A discussion of East Jerusalem would be
quite lengthy and involved; the city could quite easily serve as
a second area for parallel research. Also, statistical information
concerning East Jerusalem is not readily available. Israeli statis-
tics for the West Bank exclude that city, and Israeli statistics
on Israel do not divide it into "old" and "new" Jerusalem. There-
fore, Jerusalem will be excluded from the study.
CHAPTER TWO:
FOUNDING AND DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH SETTLEMENTS
Introduction
The placement of Israeli settlements on the West Bank has, in
almost all cases been determined by Israel's Knesset.* Decisions
concerning placement have been controversial within Israel and
within that country's government. The Labour Party (1967-1977)
was in fact unable in ten years to officially adopt a settlement
policy, due to a considerable degree of dissention within the Cabi-
net. Cabinet decisions have been the end result of a large number
of competing pressures and inputs, which have in turn changed over
time, and Cabinet members have responded accordingly. This chapter
describes the decisions and also attempts to elucidate some of the
important variables which have played into the decision-making pro-
cess.** These decisions are important in an understanding of
Jewish settler movement to the West Bank.
POSTWAR CONTROVERSY WITHIN ISRAEL CONCERNING SETTLEMENT
When Israel occupied the West Bank it was not immediately clear
to anyone—including members of Israel's cabinet—how it should be
dealt with. It was, however, clear to most Israelis that the status
* In several cases settlements which have not attained government
approval have nevertheless been established. In most of these
cases, government approval is eventually received. If it is not,
the settlement is either disbanded or moved to another location on
the West Bank, sometimes by force.
**Certainly some degree of subjectivity is involved in identifying
the "important" variables; however I believe the variables to be
discussed (albeit briefly) do, indeed, lend a fairly high percen-
tage of explanation to the settlement distribution pattern.
13
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quo which had persisted prior to the war had been unacceptable, and
that a total withdrawal to pre-war boundaries was not an option.
Premier Levi Eshkol expressed these sentiments on June 12, 1967,
when he addressed the Knesset. The address itself was not meant
for Knesset ears only, but rather for "all the nations of the
world." He said:
Be under no illusion that the State of Israel is prepared
to return to the situation that reigned up to a week ago
. . . . We are entitled to determine what are the true
and vital interests of our country and how they shall be
secured. The position that existed until now shall never
again return ... .2
While it was agreed that Israel should determine its "true
and vital interests," attempts to determine what these interests
were proved to be a much less harmonious affair. Agreement existed
only in the case of East Jerusalem; on June 28, 1967, Israel formal-
ly unified the divided city. Cabinet members strongly disagreed,
however, about the future of the remainder of the West Bank. Ex-
treme annexationists, such as Menachem Begin, believed that Israel
should retain and settle the entire territory. The very moderate,
such as Foreign Minister Abba Eban, favored the annexation of East
Jerusalem only and argued that the remainder of the West Bank should
be returned to the Arabs. Most Cabinet members positioned themselves
between these two extremes; they supported a policy of selective
settlement. They believed that certain areas should be retained for
purposes of defense and that others should be relinquished. This
view "probably received the most widespread support in the political
3community and among the public at the time."
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Initially Israel's demand for defensible borders formed the
single strongest rationale for the establishment of settlements.
It was believed that strategically-located settlements would be
capable of reducing guerilla infiltration and would also serve to
impede an Arab invasion from the East. This argument appealed to
many Israelis. It was not, however, the only argument presented.
A second potent argument involved the reestablishment of
Israel's historical presence on the West Bank. Many Jews felt that
Israel had an historic and a religious "right"—indeed, even an
"obligation"— to settle the West Bank. Such feelings gave rise to
the "Whole Land of Israel Movement" in August of 1967. The central
precept of the movement was that "all of Palestine, indivisible, is
part of Israel's historic birthright and must be immediately an-
4
nexed." Members believed that this "birthright" superceded the
rights of West Bank Arabs to self-determination. The movement it-
self had a considerable degree of popular appeal and quickly became
adept at influencing policy-makers in the Knesset. According to a
March, 1968, issue of the American Jewish journal Commentary , "(the
movement) propagates a message of such apparent emotional force and
popular attraction that even cabinet ministers, who are known to
think differently, have been afraid to disagree in public. Only
Foreign Minister Abba Eban has publicly criticized them . . . ," 5
This movement helped to propagate a reglious nationalism which con-
tinued to intensify until 1977, at which time it came to dominate
government policy under Prime Minister Menachem Begin.
There was also a much smaller and less influential group of
Israelis who favored settlement on a temporary basis only. Some of
16
those who initially opposed all settlement gravitated towards this
view in time, because the other did not seem feasible given the
public mood. These Israelis hoped that the settlements would even-
tually be liquidated in exchange for Arab concessions. They would
essentially serve as "bargaining chips." This group was not, how-
ever, organized in a formal manner.
Other factors made settlement look somewhat less attractive.
Although some Israelis believed the settlements could be used as
bargaining chips, others believed the establishment of a Jewish
population in the West Bank would serve to strengthen Arab extremism
and would thus preempt the option of negotiation. The Arabs had
been deeply humiliated by the June War, and the annexation of
Jerusalem had served to harden them. Settlement of the West Bank
might further encourage Arab intransigence.
There was also a fear of angering the international community.
The Geneva Convention, to which Israel is party, states that no
occupying power shall inhabit an occupied territory with its own
populace. Israel claims that the Convention does not apply in the
case of the West Bank because Jordan had no legitimate right to the
territory. Therefore Israel had not taken land from its rightful
owner. This argument has not found acceptance in the international
community. International law and the principles of self-determination
are, in the eyes of much of the world, antithetical to Jewish settle-
ment. Israel particularly feared incurring the displeasure of its
staunchest ally, the United States.
A final argument—and one which would profoundly effect policy
under Labour—concerned demography. The West Bank retained many Arabs
17
following the war. The highlands—which are also the historic
heartland of Judaism—were densely populated. The rate of natural
increase among the Arabs was only 3.0 per 1000 in 1967, but in the
following year it rose to a more characteristic 11.7. Thus many
Israelis quite reasonably warned that annexation of the West Bank
would mean that, by the year 2000, Arabs would outnumber Jews in
the Zionist state. Abba Eban warned:
Let us face the hard truth. If the West Bank and Gaza
Arabs were annexed, our principles would not allow us to
withhold citizenship—and our vital interest would not
allow us to grant it.^
Indeed, such an argument strikes at the very heart of Zionism.*
One of the most fundamental tenets of Zionism is that the Jewish
* Zionism is a political idealogy revolving around the perceived
necessity for a Jewish state. It is a response to 100' s of years
of persecution during the Jewish Diaspora. Although Jews through-
out this long period spoke and sometimes wrote of an independent
state. Zionism did not emerge as an important movement until the
late 1800 "s. At this time the father of modern Zionism, Theodor
Herzl, published his book, Per Judenstaat (The Jewish State) . This
book and Herzl' s subsequent work to promote the idea gave rise to
a movement which culminated— following the horrors of World War II--
in the establishment of Israel.
In his youth Theodor Herzl firmly believed Jews were best
served by assimilation in their many respective nations, but as he
observed persectuion even in "liberalized" Europe, he instead con-
cluded that antiSemitism was ineradicable. He believed that while
it might at times be latent (as it was in Germany of his time) it
would inevitably reemerge . He state it as follows:
We have sincerely tried everywhere to merge with the na-
tional communities in which we live seeking only to preserve
the faith of our fathers. It is not permitted to us
.... The world needs a Jewish state; therefore it
will arise.
The thesis of Zionism, then, is that all non-Jewish nations are
persecuting or will persecute their Jewish residents; thus Jews
must create and maintain a state in which they form a majority,
and in which they may live as citizens enjoying full rights.
18
people are and always will be subject to persecution outside the
refuge of a Jewish state. It does not matter that a non-Jewish
state such as the United States—or such as Germany at the turn of
the century—may appear to be a safe and an enlightened haven. Per-
secution remains inevitable; the question of "when" is the only
random variable. Thus, a Jewish state containing a Jewish majority
is necessary for the survival of Jews. Zionist ideology does not
permit an Arab majority. Many Zionists therefore feared an annexa-
tion of the West Bank.
THE ALLON PLAN
Israel's cabinet ministers responded to all of these arguments
and to others in a variety of ways, and a number of proposals were
made concerning the West Bank. The most important of these was
drafted by Yigal Allon, the Minister of Labour, in July of 1967.
It was never officially adopted, but it did in fact become the
policy "blueprint" under Labour.
The Allon Plan was basically a compromise. Allon claimed that
it would achieve "an integral state geographically, and a Jewish
9
state demographically, " and Abba Eban called it "a model for the
concept of maximum security with minimum addition of Arab popula-
tion." 10
The Plan originally called for the absorption into Israel of
a strip of land 10-15 kilometers in depth along the Jordan Rift
Valley. Very soon it was revised slightly so that the strip was
15-20 kilometers in depth. The strip was intended to "give the
maximum possible height and terrain advantage." It would stretch
19
from the river Jordan to the eastern margins of Arab cultivation
in the highlands. (Map II)
Two belts of Jewish settlement would be erected within this
security strip. The first of these would lie along the floor of
the Valley, extending from the Dead Sea in the south to the West
Bank's border with Israel in the north. The second would perch at
the edge of the highlands, 500 to 1000 meters above the Valley. It
would also run north-south, and would serve as the major line of
defense, guarding narrow mountain passages which might otherwise
allow an invading army to slip into the state of Israel.
Allon asserted that the strip would fortify Israel's defenses.
He also pointed out that the area to be developed was sparcely
populated by Arabs. The densely-populated highlands to the west
would not, according to the Plan, be settled by Jews. Eventually,
Israel would annex the security strip and at that time the highlands
would become either an autonomous state affiliated with Jordan or
fully independent. This would be acceptable to Israel, because the
new state would be separated from the Arab world to the east by the
bands of Israeli settlement. The Arabs would be "neutralized"
within a sea of Zionists. Nevertheless, the Allon Plan was soon
revised to allow for a thin corridor which would run through the
Valley and connect the highlands with the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan. The corridor would embrace the city of Jericho, removing
the only Arab city in the Valley from the security belt. As a re-
suit, only 6,000 Arabs would be absorbed into the strip.
A corridor was also to connect Jerusalem with the annexed strip.


















highlands at its waist. It would be padded by Jewish settlements.
The Allon Plan received a great deal of attention over a con-
siderable period of time. On June 17, 1968, it was finally reported
that "the dominant figures in the Israeli cabinet have reached a
consensus on a plan for the eventual disposition" of the West
13Bank. The "dominant figures" referred to were Levi Eshkol,
Moshe Daayan, and Allon. It was believed that the three of them
had between them "more than enough prestige and influence to per-
suade a majority of the Cabinet to back any plan they jointly sup-
^ „14port.
It was also believed that there would not be a campaign within
the cabinet for formal adoption of the Plan. This was a result of
the fact that it was not acceptable to all of the parties which
composed the ruling coalition. If the Plan were formally adopted,
dissenting cabinet members would be compelled to resign.
By the end of 1968 the Allon Plan had won the unofficial sup-
port of Israel's government. Many proponents of the Plan embraced
it with a marked lack of enthusiasm; however, it seemed to provide
the most workable compromise. The "doves" who supported the Plan
hoped that it would bolster Israel's bargaining power with the
Arabs and that it would also contribute to Israel's security.
"Hawks" derived hope from the fact that it did not immediately elim-
inate the possibility of complete annexation at a future date. In
the final analysis, the "operative part in the Allon Plan (the
establishment of Jewish settlements) became the common denominator
between the 'doves' and the 'hawks,'" 5 and the Allon Plan became
21
unofficial Israeli policy. It remained that until Labour fell from
power in 19 77.
SETTLEMENT UNDER LABOUR (1967-1977)
Government-sponsored settlement actually began before the Allon
Plan gained the support of most cabinet ministers. On September 24,
1967, Levi Eshkol announced plans for the first settlement, which
was to be at Kfar Etzion. Kfar Etzion had once been a kibbutz
which, along with three other kibbutzim in the Etzion bloc, had
been overrun by the Jordanian Arab Legion in 1948. The Etzion bloc
itself perched above the floor of the Jordan Valley between the
cities of Hebron and Bethlehem; it was strategically located for
the defense of Jerusalem. When it was overrun in 1948, many mem-
bers of the kibbutz perished. It had since become an Arab Legion
camp occupied by Jordanian forces
.
On September 28, fifteen young men and three young women of
the Israeli Army's Nahal Corps* moved into the abandoned Arab
1
8
Legion camp and began rebuilding the kibbutz. Most of these were
sons and daughters of Kfar Etzion' s original settlers. Although
Israel claimed that they represented a garrison rather than set-
tlers, the New York Times commented that the young people "appeared
to consider themselves the vanguard of Israelis who will settle
the captured West Bank," and also that "the soldiers who went to
Kfar Etzion today clearly intend to remain there as civilians after
* Nahal units are Israel's "Pioneer Fighting Youth." 17 Nahal is a
paramilitary youth organization which combines military service
with agricultural training. Often the units are employed in the
establishment of new settlements in vulnerable areas. They
strengthen the Israeli presence in these selected areas and pre-
pare the land for an eventual civilian presence. Often members
of the founding unit remain in the new settlement as civilians.
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19their demobilization." The settlement did, indeed, become a reli-
gious kibbutz
.
The process of settlement continued. In February of 1968, the
first settlement was established in the Jordan Valley. Members of
Nahal Mehola developed the land and in 1969, Mehola became a moshav
shittufi Nahal Kalia and Nahal Argaman were also founded in 1968;
the first of these eventually became a kibbutz, while the second
became a moshav. All three of these Nahal settlements were located
near points of guerilla infiltration into the West Bank, and all
were on the floor of the Jordan Valley.
Another significant movement of Israelis onto the West Bank
also took place in 1968. These prospective settlers did not actu-
ally found a settlement until 1970, but their controversial story
began to unfold in 1968, when seventy-three fundamentalist Jews
traveled to Hebron, ostensibly to celebrate the Passover. They
checked into a motel and then refused to leave, demanding the
right to settle within Judaism's second holiest city. The govern-
ment was divided over how to handle the demand. While the issue
was being debated in the Knesset, the settlers were moved from
Hebron and into a nearby military administration compound. This
move was mandated because the government did not want to inflame
Hebron's Arabs. Eventually, Yigal Allon's proposal of a "dual
city" was the accepted solution within the cabinet. He recommended
that a Jewish quarter be built in the hills east of the Arab city.
The Jewish quarter, Kiryat 'Arba, would be incorporated into the
security belt at its western edge, while Hebron would remain Arab.
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In 19 70 the government approved the construction of Kiryat 'Arba.
A very difficult question had been answered in this case with
the concept of a dual city. The question would, however, be raised
again and again. The controversy over Hebron exposed a fundamental
conflict for which the Allon Plan proposed no solution. This con-
flict is inherent in the belief that Jews have a right to the entire
historic "homeland" and that the Jewish state must, at the same
time, remain unequivocally Jewish. Areas which are densely popu-
lated with Arabs become quite troubling, as a result, and the
question of settlement distribution is complicated by religious
nationalism, historic "rights," and Zionist principles. Kiryat
'Arba represented a warning that this conflict remained unresolved.
This settlement also provides an early example of the ability
of certain settlement groups to exert successful pressure upon
policy makers. The settlers of Kiryat 'Arba set a precedent for
later groups who would disapprove of government policy and who
learned to force change through utilization of direct action. With
the exception of Kiryat 'Arba, however, Labour was not troubled by
such groups until the rise of Gush Emunin in 1974. The majority
of the settlements established under Labour fit neatly into Yital
Allon's Plan.
Prior to 19 71 most of the settlements were located in the Jor-
dan Valley. Allon's first and eastern-most line of settlement was
being constructed. By the end of 1970 there was a moshav, a moshav
shittufi, kibbutz, and five Nahals in the Jordan Valley. All five
of the Nahals were being prepared for civilian occupation. There
24
was also a moshav located in the Latrun salient, which is in the
highlands within Allon's corridor leading from Jerusalem to the
security strip. There were, in addition, two religious kibbutzim
and a regional center in the Etzion bloc. (Kfar Etzion was one of
these kibbutzim.) Kiryat 'Arba had also been constructed; it was
an urban settlement in the hills near Hebron. (Map III)
By October of 1973, when Israel was distracted from the settle-
ment process by the eruption of war, both of Allon's proposed belts
were clearly taking shape. A new moshav had been located in the
Valley, and two Nahals , a moshav, and a regional center formed the
initial outline of the second and higher belt of settlement to the
west.
In October Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on
Israel. The war lasted three weeks before a successful cease-fire
was implemented. The Arabs fought well, and Israel emerged badly
shaken. Prior to the war most Israelis had been content with an
image of Israel's overwhelming military superiority. They did not
believe the Arabs would be willing to fight again for a number of
years. Israel had been complacent; thus a period of national
"soul-searching" ensued after the war. The building of new settle-
ments slowed considerably at this time. The nation as a whole was
preoccupied; in addition, international pressure upon Israel had
intensified. Even within the United State there was a degree of
shift towards certain moderate Arab nations, particularly Egypt.
As a result the United States pressured Israel to halt the building


















I. Mehola 2. Argaman 3. Massuah 4. Phatza'el
5. Gilgal 6. Yitav 7. Kalia 8. Mitzpe Shalem
9. Mevo Horon Gimmel 10. Rosh Tzurim
II. Alon Shvot 12. Kfar Etzion 13. Kiryat 'Arba
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In 19 74, mainly as a result of errors made in the October War,
Golda Meir's cabinet resigned. Another member of the Labour Party,
Yitzhak Rabin, stepped up. He too initiated very little action on
the West Bank.
In mid-1975 the mood in Israel began to shift to the right.
The PLO was strengthening and gaining considerable prestige in the
Arab world. Israel's fears and sense of vulnerability— legacies
in part of the October War—were heightened. Isolation in the
international community also contributed to the new mood. In addi-
tion, the United States was preoccupied with a number of issues and
it therefore exerted less pressure on Israel. A result of the shift
to the right and a softening of U. S. pressure was the surge in
West Bank development which took place during Rabin's final two
years in office.
Although the government continued to honor Yigal Allon's con-
cept of "maximum security with minimum addition of Arab population,"
the rise of Gush Emunin during this period sounded the first "death
knell" for the Allon Plan. Gush Emunin is an organization which
emerged out of the National Religious Party's Brei Akiva youth
movement and from its religious seminaries. It is composed almost
entirely of young ultra-orthodox Jews . Members of Gush Emunin are
united in their belief that "the national justification for settle-
ment is an ultimate, metaphysical, historico-religious command
which obliges the Jewish people to seek total reunion with the in-
tegral Land of Israel. Settlement is an absolute moral obligation,
which is precedent to any consideration of the needs of the state,
26
society, the individual, neighboring peoples, or the international
20
community." Gush Emunin therefore stresses the need to settle
the highlands of Judea and Samaria.
Members of this group began moving to the highlands, in very
small numbers, in 19 74. At first they were forcibly removed by
the military. They persisted in this action, however, and in 1975
began to realize some success. Considerable dissent within the
government concerning the goals of Gush Emunin led to Knesset
vacillation and inaction. By the time Labour relinquished power
in 1977 three Gush Emunin settlements had been established in the
highlands. All were officially "illegal" but were not forcibly
disassembled.
Labour fell from power in June of 19 77.* At this time there
were thirty-six settlements on the West Bank; three of these were
The defeat of Labour in 19 77 was the end result of a number of
interacting factors, with the major catalyst being the October War
of 1973. Following this war (as is discussed above) Israelis ex-
perienced a heightened sense of vulnerability and international iso-
lation. The public mood shift brought increased acceptance and
respectability to political views (such as those espoused by the
Likud Party) which many voters had considered excessively hard-lined
prior to the war. 21
This alone does not account for Labour's defeat, however, be-
cause the public mood shift was paralleled within that Party. The
result was a "narrowing of policy differences between the . . .
Labour Party and the opposition Likud on issues of peace and terri-
tory."^ 2 This eventually handicapped the incumbents. They were
held responsible for perceived failures in the October War, which
lead to the resignation of Golda Meir's cabinet in 19 74. Following
the resignation polical infighting and scandal worsened the Party'simage. In addition, Labour had to contend with public dissatisfica-
tion over inflationary pressures. Given an acceptable alternativein the Likud Party, many voters shifted loyalties.
It should also be mentioned that in 1977, Likud received strong
electoral support from low-income voters and from Asian and African
Jews, who had increased in number and who had felt alienated under
Labour. ^-3 Likud also received considerable support from Israel's
young voters, who were "particularly" hard-lined in their views. 24
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"illegal." The others lay within the bounds of Allon's security
belt. (Map IV)
SETTLEMENT UNDER LIKUD ( 1977-Present)
Menachem Begin 's Likud formed a new and a more conservative
ruling coalition in 1977. As early as 1948, Begin had stated:
The homeland is historically and geographically an entity.
Whoever fails to recognize our right to the entire home-
land, does not recognize our right to any of its terri-
tories. We shall never yield our natural and eternal
rights .25
Like the members of Gush Emunin, Begin proclaims Israel's right to
the Whole Land. Such a stance contrasts sharply with emphasis
under Labour on defense and demographic considerations. In 1977,
religious and historic obligation superceded these considerations;
the new government essentially began "using the Bible as a title
26deed." All Gush Emunin activies were legalized, and the densely-
populated Samarian highlands became top priority for Jewish settle-
ment.
A number of Gush Emunin settlements were immediately founded
and in March of 1978, members of the movement were permitted to
settle on the outskirts of the West Bank's largest city, Nablus
.
When this decision was made "the last vestige of geographical con-
straint was overthrown and the transition from the Allon Plan to
27unfettered maximalism was complete."
In December of 1977 Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture and
Settlements, proposed a new and a bolder plan for the West Bank.
He recommended a third belt of settlements which would extend from






















1. Mehola 13. Kiryat 'Arba 25. Mevo Shiloh
2. Argaman 14. Shlomit 26. Kokhav Hashahar
3. Massuah 15. Tomer 27. Romonin
4. Phatza'el 16. Netiv Hagdud 28. Mishor Adumin
5. Gilgal 17. Na 'aren 29. Tekoah
6. Yitav 18. Alraog 30. Malki Shua
7. Kalia 19. Ro'i 31. Reihona
8. Mitzpe Shalem 20. Bega 'ot 32. Kaddum
8. Mevo Horon Gimmel 21. Hamra 33. Mas 'ha
10. Rosh Tzurim 22. Mekhora 34. Ofra
11. Alon Shvot 23. Gitit 35. Elazar
12. Kfar Etzion 24. Ma 'ale Ephraim 36. Yattir
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The new government responded to the proposal by allowing Gush Emunin
2 8to begin construction of the settlements.
In October of 1978—only a month after Camp David— the World
Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency together deveoped the
first five-year settlement plan for Judea and Samaria. The cabinet
approved this plan. Its basic objective was to establish blocs
among areas densely populated by Arabs. The settlements would
"surround the major Palestinian towns and prevent their expansion"
29
and would "cut off Arab towns from each other." The plan also
effected the area around Jericho in 'the Jordan Valley, which had
been left untouched by Labour. Jericho was to be surrounded by six
Israeli settlements. This would preempt the option of returning
Jericho to the Arabs at a future date. In all, forty-six new
settlements were to be established within a period of only five
years. The plan states:
The disposition of the settlements must be carried out not
only around the settlements of the minorities, but also
in between them
,
this in accordance with the settlement
policy adopted in Galilee and in other parts of the coun-
try. 3D
Only the region about Jenin was unaffected by the plan. However,
it was revised in 19 80 to include another bloc of settlements which
would surround Jenin.
This plan, often called the Drobles Plan, proved somewhat dif-
ficult to implement. Although nearly half of the November 1979
31budget was dedicated to its realization, this was not money enough.
Also, Israel was beginning to experience a shortage of people needed
29
to establish and populate the settlements. Many Israelis had no
desire to leave homes on the coastal plain for a life in the arid
Valley or in the Arab-populated highlands. Although such moves
were subsidized by the government, new settlers often experienced
an initial drop in living standards. In addition, settlers often
lived in tents or in temporary housing for some time before the
government was able to fund more attractive quarters . Unattractive
climatic conditions, unfriendly Arabs, occasionally primitive living
conditions, and adverse monetary conditions inhibited many Israelis
from joining settlements. Also, immigration into Israel had been
declining since the October War in 19 73; in the early 19 80's, emi-
gration actually began to exceed the rate of immigration. New im-
migrants were needed in substantial numbers to populate the settle-
ments, but these numbers were simply unavailable. The Drobles Plan
therefore faced several very real restraints. Nevertheless the
plan was implemented in part; quite a number of settlements were
established, and many existing settlements were expanded.
A particularly controversial development began to materialize
in late 19 79. At this time settlers in Kiryat 'Arba, who had been
demanding the right to move out of the Jewish quarter and into
Hebron itself, took over a building in Hebron. The government
ordered the settlers to leave but when they refused, no action was
taken. In January of 1980 one of the settlers was killed; this pre-
sented the others with an opportunity to demand "appropriate Zionist
32
response," meaning the right 1
this was granted by the cabinet,
' to settle in Hebron. On February 10
30
Several months later the cabinet was split over another pro-
posal concerning Hebron. This one suggested that two Jewish
schools be established in the Arab city. Again, the proposal was
accepted.
In 19 81 Israel had an election year, and Likud suddenly under-
took a flurry of West Bank activity. Cabinet members feared a
Labour victory which might lead to concessions on the West Bank.
In order to preempt Labour's options, settlements were constructed
as swiftly as possible. Ten new settlements were planned. Several
were to surround Jericho, which was already partially enclosed by
three settlements, because the cabinet feared Labour would find the
region around Jericho to be negotiable. There were also plans to
build 3000 new homes in three existing settlements. These were
Karnei Shomron, Elkana, and Shavei Shomron, each of which is in
33the Samarian highlands. Not all of Likud's plans were brought to
fruition, but the attempt to "prevent a change in the status of the
34West Bank in the case of an Alignment victory at the polls" was
a substantial one.
On June 30, 1981, Menachem Begin was again given the opportun-
ity to form a governing coalition. He did so successfully. A part
of his election day oath went as follows:
I, Menachem Begin, the son of Ze'ev and Hasia Begin do
solemnly swear that as long as I serve the nation as
prime minister, we will not leave any part of Jydea,
Samaria, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. ^
Indeed, the Jerusalem Post's pre-election poll revealed that three-
quarters of Israel's Jews favored continued settlement on the
31
36West Bank. The election mandated Begin to proceed with plans
At the end of 1980 there were seventy-four settlements on the
West Bank. According to the Drobles Plan, which the government
has embraced, fifty-nine additional settlements are projected.
Some of these have since been established. (Map V)
OBTAINING LAND FOR SETTLEMENTS
A brief discussion of how Israel lays claim to West Bank land
is in order at this point. Israel mounts a number of arguments to
justify Jewish possession of the land.
One such argument concerns national security needs. Military
Order 388 authorizes the military governor "to declare any area to
be a closed area and to prohibit anyone from entering or leaving
37it without a permit." Immediately following the 1967 War much
of the land along the Jordan River and in the Latrun Valley was
declared a "security zone." The area along the Jordan was nearly
void of Arab population, but in the Latrun Valley three Arab vil-
lages were demolished and 4000 residents sent to the Jordan Rivers
38Last Bank. 20,000 dunums of cultivated land were left behind by
39the refugees. Since that time, kibbutzim and a large park have
been established in the Latrun Valley.*
Additional security zones have also been founded. The process
usually begins when a piece of land is fenced off by the military,
and those Arabs who live upon or cultivate the tract are ordered to
leave. The next step is often arrival of a Nahal unit and finally,
once the land has been adequately prepared, civilian settlers appear.
* The Latrun Valley "thrusts across the main route between Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv and, according to the Israeli government, was a main











Sources: Harris, 1980. Matar, 1981. Mroz, 1980.
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KEY TO MAP V
1. Mehola 26. Almog 51. Karnei Shomron B
2. Mehola B 27. Kalia 52. Elkana
3. Sheloh 28. Horkamia 53. Ariel
4. Argaman 29. Mitzpe Shalem 54 Tapuah
5. New Massuah 30. Ma 'ale Adumin B 55. Shiloh
6. Massuah 31. Mishor Adumin 56. Halamish E
7. Yafit 32. Ma' ale Adumin 57. Halamish
8. Phatza'el 33. Tekoah 58. Ofra
9. Tomer 34. Kiryat 'Arba 59. Beit El B
10. Gilgal 35. Nahal Zohar 60. Beit El
11. Netiv Hagdud 36. Ma 'on Carmel B 61. Beit Horon
12. Na'aren 37. Yattir 62. Mitzpe Givon
13. Yitav 38. Malki Shua 63. Givon
14. Ro'i 39. Magen Shaul 64. Matiyahu
15. Bega'ot 40. Mei Ami 65. Shelat
16. Hamra 41. Reihan B 66. Kfar Ruth
17. Mekhora 42. Reihan 67. Mevo Horon
18. Gitit 43. Dotan 68. Hargilo
19. Ma 'ale Ephraim 44. Sanur 69. Efrat
20. Mevo Shiloh 45. Ma 'ale Nahal 70. Elazar
21. Kokhav Hashahar 46. Shevei Shomron 71. Migdal Oz
22. Romonin 47. Jebel Kbir 72. Rosh Tzurim
23. Neima 48. Kaddum 73. Alon Shvot
24. Mitzpe Jericho B 49. Salit 74. Kfar Etzion
25. Mitzpe Jericho 50. Karnei Shomron
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This "enables title of the land to be 'laundered' by the temporary
41
administration of the Israeli Defense Forces."
A second and more common technique involves utilization of the
"state land" argument. State land is all land which cannot be
shown to be privately owned. The difficulty, as might be expected,
exists in determining whether or not land is privately owned. Land-
holdings on the West Bank which may possibly be considered private
fall into three broad categories. An enumeration of these is help-
ful in an understanding of the difficulty in defining "state land."
"Mulk" land is privately held land to which owners have clear
title. In most cases Israel has not challenged these titles.
"Miri" land is land to which no one holds title; it comprises
42
70 percent of the West Bank. These lands have been cultivated by
the same families for many generations and have more recently
been registered with the Jordanian Ministry of Finance for tax
purposes. Arabs argue that this land is private because they have
long cultivated it and paid taxes on it. They have no titles simply
because it is unsurveyed. Occasionally, an Arab challenges the Jew-
ish authorities who lay claim to "miri" land and when this happens,
government lawyers have not attempted to refute Arab arguments.
Most often, they resort to an insistence that the land is necessary
for Israel's security; the security argument preempts all other
claims
.
The final type of landholding is termed "jiftlik" land. This
is land which was registered in the name of the Ottoman Sultan in
the nineteenth century, and which then passed into the hands of the
33
British and the Jordanian governments. The registration was ini-
tially intended to serve as a temporary measure only, because the
land in question had not been surveyed. Meanwhile it was culti-
vated and bought and sold by Arab farmers as if it were privately
owned; and in fact, the governments which taxed these farmers prior
to 1967 also regarded it as private.
If each of these landholding categories is assumed to be pri-
vate, some interesting figures are arrived at. In 1979 it was
estimated that 126,000 dunums* of West Bank land had been claimed
by Jewish civilians. Only 9.4 percent of this land did not fall
within one of the categories. Thus it is sometimes argued that
90.6 percent of the land presently occupied by Jewish civilians
had been privately owned by Arabs.
A final means by which Israel lays claim to West Bank terri-
tory is through use of absentee property laws . Order Number 125
states that anyone who was absent from the West Bank on June 7,
1967, may not return. This Order has been particularly useful in
the Jordan Valley, where about 4 percent of the land belongs to
absentee landlords. The land is viewed as deserted.
Arabs can seek recourse to the loss of lands through Israeli
courts, but they are often discouraged by the prospects of a diffi-
cult and costly litigation. They are also disheartened by the fact
that such cases usually result, at the most, in a temporary injunc-
tion against development of the land. The majority of the cases are
lost on security grounds. Although Arabs who lose land usually re-
ceive compensation, most of them would much prefer return of the
* A dunum is approximately one-quarter of an acre.
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land; and because Israeli courts have disappointed them, much anger
and bitterness has resulted.
In late 1980 Israel was in control of twenty-five to thirty-
five percent of the West Bank.* Not all of this area was in settle-
ment; some was used for military training and manuevers , and much
of it was being prepared for future settlement. And some of it
was simply idle, as Israel was not yet able to implement all of
its plans for the West Bank.
* When Israel's Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohen retired, he
spoke of Israel's land claims as follows: "We hold Judea and Samaria
as trustees only. It is elementary knowledge that a trustee who
takes for himself from the trust property is stealing in one of
the ugliest ways." 46
In late 1980 Michael Hudson made this estimate in The Journal
of Palestine Studies47 and Ibrahim Matar concurred in the following
year
.
4a According to the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan, Isreal
controlled approximately twenty-seven percent of the West Bank in
1980, or 1.5 million dunums of land. 49 In early 1982 Donald Will
suggested that one third of the West Bank was under Israeli con-
trol. 50
CHAPTER THREE: THE JEWISH SETTLERS
Introduction
The Jewish settlements on the West Bank are intensely contro-
versial and frequently debated. This chapter will address the
question of how settlers are recruited and selected, and will at-
tempt to shed light on some of the characteristics of the West
Bank's Jewish population. These characteristics include ideology,
religious beliefs, former residences, age and marital status. The
chapter will also deal with economic activities and with actual
numbers of settlers, as well as with distribution of the settlers.
RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION
Only recognized settlement groups are allowed to locate on
the West Bank. These groups must first organize themselves and
then obtain recognition from the government. An acceptable settle-
ment group is required to meet the following criteria.*
1. "The existence of a defined social topic, approved by the
authorized authorities,
2. "Implementation of self-labor and a cooperative settlement,
3. "Joint ownership of enterprises and services for employment,
4. "The authority of the settlement to accept new members in
accordance with the approved plan,
5. "The independence of the settlement in determining its own
way of life and in all which pertains to joining a
national settlement movement." 1 **
* This list of criteria is not comprehensive. I believe the most
pertinent points have been included.
**National settlement movements include the moshavim, moshav




When one reads through this list, terms such as "defined social
topic," "joint ownership," and self-labor" stand out clearly.
These are worthy of further discussion.
Members of a particular group do, indeed, espouse many similar
values; which makes it easier to arrive at a "defined social topic."
Sometimes a settlement is associated with the political party which
most nearly represents the beliefs of its members. A specific
moshav, for instance, may be peopled exclusively by members of the
Herut party and their families.*
The social ideals of a settlement group are important in deter-
mining which National Settlement Movement the group will choose to
join. For instance, a kibbutz is defined as "an Israeli collective
farm or settlement, cooperatively owned and operated by its members
2and organized on a communal basis." There is no private property
on a kibbutz, and all production and consumption are organized on
a collective basis. Even the families live communally; there are
no separate family dwellings. Thus, kibbutzim attract Jews who
espouse many of the ideals of socialism. These same Jews also
gravitate towards the Labour Party. The kibbutzim have traditionally
provided a "pool of material and manpower resources" upon which
Labour could draw, and many of Labour's most outstanding members
* Settlement groups do not necessarily identify with a particular
political party. Gush Emunin, for instance, is a religiously-
inspired, ultra-nationalist group with well-defined goals; these
goals are not necessarily shared by any one political party. Al-
though the Likud coalition has supported the aspirations of the
group in some cases, members of Gush Emunin are increasingly dis-
illusioned with the present government. They feel that the West
Bank is being settled too slowly and with too much caution.
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have come from the ranks of the kibbutzim. As a result of this, a
historical antipathy has been bred between the kibbutzim and the
more right-winged Herut which dominates Israel's ruling coalition
at present.*
The moshav movement attracts a somewhat different membership
than do the kibbutzim. A moshav is defined as "a cooperative small-
holders settlement of individual farms .... Individuals own
their own farms and personal property. Work is organized collective-
ly, equipment is used cooperatively, and produce is marketed joint-
4ly. Moshavim are Israel's most popular form of cooperative agri-
cultural settlement. The amount of collective activity varies from
settlement to settlement, but in almost all cases individuals are
allowed to farm their own plots. As a result the moshavim attract
a much larger and more heterogeneous membership than do the kibbut-
zim. The kibbutzim attract young socialist immigrants from Europe,
but appeal very little to Jews who were raised in Israel or who
have immigrated from non-European countries. In particular they
attract very few Jews from Eastern cultures, because family ties
receive more emphasis among these Jews.
The final form of collective agricultural
' settlement is the
moshav shitufi'im. Because by 1977 these had almost disappeared
in the West Bank, they will be only briefly discussed. A moshav
shitufi is a "collective smallholders settlement that combines the
* Likud has reacted by funneling very little of the Ministry of Agri-
culture's development budget into the kibbutzim. The budget has
instead favored the moshavim and other settlement movements. How-
ever, many of today's kibbutzim are involved in industry as well
as in agriculture. This new emphasis on industrial development
has helped the kibbutzim to "ride out" the monetary drought dealt
them by Likud.
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economic features of a kibbutz with the social features of a moshav.
Farming is done collectively, and profits are shared equally. Each
5family lives in its own household, as in the moshav." The few
moshav shitufi'im which were developed in the Jordan Valley soon
became moshavim instead, because winter crop production in the
Valley was so lucrative that it made profit-sharing unattractive.
The disappearance of the moshav shitufi'im illustrated the fact
that an established settlement may join another settlement group
if the members so choose.
It should again be noted that collective agricultural settle-
ments are not the only acceptable settlement movements; Nahal posts,
urban settlements such as Kiryat Arba, and regional and area cen-
ters which may house government offices , supply shops, and even
industry, are also located on the West Bank.
Prospective settlement groups are required to agree not only
on a defined social topic, but also on the principle of self-labor.
This particular criteria is elaborated upon because in practice
it is espoused more in "word" than in "deed." The principle was
adhered to during the earlier history of the collective movements,
but it underwent a marked deterioration following the 1967 War.
The moshavim have defected more than have the kibbutzim. Many of
the moshavim in the Valley are engaged in labor-intensive enter-
prises such as hot-house flower production, while the kibbutzim
favor highly-mechanized branches of activity. Thus the moshavim
have drawn increasingly upon the supply of cheap Arab labor. The
kibbutzim have also wandered somewhat from the principle of self-
labor. Collectivist values have weakened since Israel gained
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independence, and the kibbutzim have "adapted to the surrounding
society's new, more individualistic and materialist orientation."
Today Arab laborers may be found on many kibbutzim.
Once a settlement group is organized and has met the criteria
for approval, it may then petition the government to allow it to
settle in a particular area. The government claims that strategic
and political significance is the most important variable in deter-
mining whether or not the proposal receives approval. Economic
variables and the perceived necessity of population dispersal are
of secondary importance, and the final factor is the wishes of the
7
affected settlement group. However, in reality these groups are
sometimes capable of exerting a considerable amount of pressure
upon the government; the ultra-Orthodox settlers of Kiryat Arba
are a case in point, as are other members of Gush Emunin. The most
controversial proposals usually involve the desire to settle near
(or within) areas which are heavily populated by Arabs..
The settlement group's choice of location is influenced by
varying factors. Early settlements in the Jordan Valley were often
constructed at the limits of land farmed by the Arabs; usually they
were placed no more than two or three kilometers from the existing
8Arab village. "Absentee" land and idle wells also attracted set-
tlers. On a broader level the Allon Plan was influential, but a
choice of specific site was affected by the desire to engage in
agriculture
.
Other factors have also been important. Many West Bank settle-
ments are placed on major roads; this is perhaps more a function of
40
security than of convenience. Ma 'ale Adumin, for example, dominates
the Jerusalem-Jericho highway. Its function is largely strategic,
and it boasts an Israeli army base. It is also evident that many
settlement blocs are placed so as to surround and separate Arab
cities. In addition, settlers are drawn to areas which were popu-
lated by Jews prior to 1948. The Etzion bloc and Kiryat Arba are
examples. Finally, a number of settlements have been built around
former Jordanian army bases or police stations. Often the build-
ings are quickly converted for use by Israeli soldiers.*
Sometimes settlement groups are formed in Israel but they
also may form in other countries. For instance, the town of Efran,
between Bethlehem and Gush Etzion, is populated by 200 Jewish fami-
lies from the United States. In Samaria the Heres settlement is
occupied mostly by immigrants from the USSR. One of the Gush
Etzion settlements is peopled by religious North American Jews.
When a group of immigrants (or prospective immigrants) gathers
to form a settlement group, the members generally share the follow-
ing characteristics
:
(1) "Rejection of urban lifestyles in all their negative as-
pects and the desire to create a way of life which ap-
pears more just in their eyes.
(2) "The desire to overcome absorption, social and economic
difficulties by joint settlement with an organized
group , " and
(3) "The desire to benefit from the assistance granted by
settlement authorities to all those who reside in areas
deemed important to the cause of settlement." 9
* This listing is surely not comprehensive, but the above-mentioned
factors stand out when maps and information concerning former
and present land use are studied.
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They also adhere to similar social values and religious beliefs.
A settlement group is not necessarily homogeneous in origin,
however. Gush Emunin's Beit Al , for instance, consists mostly
of Israeli families but also has a sprinkling of American and
Soviet immigrants.
During and after the establishment of a settlement members are
carefully selected. Selection of all new members is done by a
committee comprised of representatives of the settlement itself,
from the settlement movement with which the settlement is associ-
ated, and from the Jewish Agency or World Zionist Organization.
Members are selected according to how well they fit the criteria
established by the settlement.
Before selection takes place, the settlement group usually
advertises its need for new members. This Gush Emunin ad appeared
in an Israeli newspaper on December 26, 1975:
We have returned to:
Kiryat Arba—in the hills of Hebron
Gush Etzion—in the hills of Hebron
Maalei Adumim—in the Judean Desert
Ophira—in the hills of Beit Al
Gigit—in lower Samaria . . .
Still before us are:
. . . Western Samaria, Shihah, Givon, Doton, Tirtza, Tekpa,
Ashtemoa. If you want to join an existing settlement or a
nucleus for a future settlement, please contact our office
.11
Prospective settlers must be of "suitable" age, which is de-
fined for all settlements as "no older than thirty-five." 12 Some-
times a settlement also prefers only married couples, but usually
young singles are also accepted.
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If the prospective settlers are recent immigrants, the selec-
tion process is exceptionally stringent. The immigrants are inter-
viewed and also undergo medical and psychological examinations.
Their formal abilities are analyzed, and usually those selected
are exposed to a degree of professional retraining, as well as to
. . . 13training in areas which are new to them.* Thus most new settlers
are prepared to begin productive activity immediately upon arrival
at the settlement. This is in contrast to the mass settlement
period of the 19 50's when there was not time for extensive prepara-
tion, and when new settlers often had to be trained after rather
than before they reached their destinations.
The government itself encourages Jews to join settlement groups
by offering tax exemptions at the rate of 7% of a settler's income.
This cut has not been highly effective, however, because a move to
the territories still means at least an initial drop in living
standards for most Israelis. The Israelis who settle in the West
Bank are not drawn primarily by promises of a tax exemption; other
factors play more prominently in the decision-making process.**
It has been suggested that those who are drawn to West Bank
settlements adhere to one of two ideological stances. They are
either religious Jews who argue that "Jewish settlement and control
of all of Biblical Israel is in accordance with divine 'promise'"
or they are "secular nationalists, who argue that territorial
* The Jewish Agency is responsible for the training.
**The tax cuts and the promise of assistance from settlement authori-
ties (mentioned above) may be more effective in the attraction of
immigrants and of young Israelis who are in school or recent grad-
uates than in the attraction of more "established" Israelis.
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expansion to Israel's ancient borders is a necessity for maintain-
ing both its military and historical integrity." ~ Those who wish
to recruit new settlers often appeal primarily to these sentiments
in order to increase the Jewish presence on the West Bank.
ECONOMIC BASE
Settlers on the West Bank are involved in a variety of economic
activities. These include primary, secondary and tertiary activi-
ties. Most settlements have an economic base of their own, although
a few Samarian settlements serve as "bedroom communities" for the
city of Jerusalem.
Agriculture is of importance in the Jordan Valley. The Valley
climate is well-suited to the cultivation of winter vegetables for
export to markets in Europe. The majority of the Valley settle-
ments are involved in the export of vegetables, but all moshavim and
kibbutzim are also involved in other branches of agriculture. Mono-
culture is avoided by these Settlement Movements because it creates
a peak season of labor demand, which makes a mockery of the self-
labor principle. Thus the settlements are also involved in raising
citrus fruit, flowers, poultry, and certain field crops. Fish ponds,
dairies, and vineyards are also found in the Valley.
A few of the Valley settlements support some small industry.
Hamra has a metal workshop, Mekhora houses a plan precision-locks
16
workshop, and Mehola supports a metal factory.
Settlements in the highlands are usually less agricultural in
nature. In many cases cultivatable land is unavailable. The Gush
Etzion bloc, for instance, is located on inhospitable soils.
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Highland settlers have adjusted to the situation in a number of
ways. Religious schools and military workshops have been establish-
ed. Public services are provided. Elazar houses a chemical labora-
tory and a toy factory, and a steel plant is located in Kaddum. Some
settlements lose at least part of their citizenry on a daily basis
to Jerusalem. Alon Shvot, in the Etzion bloc, has no economic
base; most citizens are Yeshiva students who commute daily to Tel
17Aviv or Jerusalem.
Where agriculture exists, it generally consists of turkey runs
and orchards. Economic diversity is common, but agriculture plays
a much less important role in this mix than it does in the Valley.
A fairly recent development has been that of the industrial
village. This is an arrangement whereby an industrial park is
jointly owned by a cluster of settlements; the Etzion bloc is an
example of such a cluster. An industrial village operates on the
principle that most individual settlements are not large enough to
support substantial industry, while a cluster of settlements can
provide the necessary threshold. Industrial villages have attracted
Israelis who prefer a rural lifestyle but are not accepted into a
moshav or a kibbutz. For instance, many of those who have been
raised on a moshav wish to return to the same, but unless they are
trained in a "preferred profession" or own a piece of land in the
moshav, they cannot settle there. 18 Because land by law cannot be
divided among heirs, only one son is absorbed into a moshav. The
others may find industrial villages to be an attractive alternative.
The villages also attract young people who have learned skills which
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are valuable in industry, but who prefer a rural lifestyle.
Area centers are also found in the West Bank. These support
themselves through the provision of needed supplies and services,
and they sometimes house government offices. In addition there
are settlements which remain entirely military in nature. And
finally, there is a very large Israeli park in the West Bank which
occupies 4200 (dunums) and is reserved for recreational use.
NUMBERS
There is no consensus concerning the number of Jews who reside
in the West Bank. The reason for this is made clear by the follow-
ing example: In February of 19 80, Gush Emunin claimed there were
only 5000 settlers in the West Bank. Menachem Begin insisted there
were 7200, and the Israeli media quoted a figure close to 12,000.
An article in the Journal of Palestine Studies stated that there
were 14,000 settlers, and the U. S. State Department held that the
19
correct figure was 10,000.
Most— if not all—of these claims reflect the interests of the
groups which have made them. Gush Emunin, for instance, is inter-
ested in a large increase in the number of Jewish settlers. They
argue that the settlement process is too slow. It is in their
interests to suggest that only a small number of Jews are presently
in the West Bank; this is an aid to their lobbying effort. The
Journal of Palestine Studies
, at the opposite extreme, is interested
in demonstrating that an illegal de facto annexation is taking place,
and that the number of Jewish settlers is quite substantial.
Statistical data concerning the settlers is conspicuously
lacking. This discussion of settler numbers will, as a result, be
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a discussion of claims made. All claims should be viewed with a
degree of caution, but general trends do emerge.
W. W. Harris reports that by 19 75, the Jewish population in
the Jordan Valley was 1800.* If the settlement at Kiryat Arba is
not included, this number is reduced to only 620. At the same time
20Arab population in the Valley was at 22,000. Thus even with the
inclusion of Kiryat Arba, the Jews constituted only 8% of the popu-
lation of the Valley. By June of 1977—according again to Harris
—
the settler population had increased to 3300. This was an increase
of 80% from 1975. The population of Kiryat Arba was 1400, meaning
21that approximately 1900 Jews lived at other locations. The aver-
22
age population at each site was 130 persons.
Harris states that by 1978 the Valley population had grown
to 3990 Jews. 26,220 Arabs also lived in the Valley, meaning Jews
constituted 13% of the total population. Meanwhile 3 800 Jews had
settled in the highlands. Approximately 1400 of these were in the
Gush Etzion bloc. An additional 1870 were at Gush Emunin sites,
and 530 lived elsewhere. Jews constituted only .5% of the total
23population of the highlands.
When all of these figures are added together, they suggest
that 7790 Jews lived on the West Bank in 1978. At this time an
official Israeli source claimed that 3000 Israelis lived in the
highlands, 1700 at Kiryat Arba, and 1550 in the Jordan Valley. 24
This total is only 6250.
The claims and counterclaims continue. The following table
concerning the West Bank's Jewish population at the end of
* W. W. Harris' book is an elaboration upon a geographical disserta-
tion.
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April, 1979, appeared in the Journal of Palestine Studies . 25
AREA







Hebron, Bethlehem and Jericho
Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm
Jordan Valley
The researcher contends that 15,000 Jews resided in the West Bank
in mid-1979. He further states that only 3200 Jews were in the
West Bank in May of 1977— a figure very close to Harris' figure
—
and that by mid-1981, the number had risen to 17,400. This re-
26presents an increase of 500% under Menachem Begin. In March of
1981 Macleans magazine made a similar claim, stating that 18,000
27
settlers lived in the West Bank.
The Macleans statement was, however, qualified. Although 18,000
28settlers were present, there were only 3000 families. This is an
important point because it indicates that the ratio of children to
adults is high. This is to be expected, because most settlers are
in the peak of the child-bearing years. Although the actual number
of Jewish settlers is much debated, it may at least be stated with
certainty that it is a youthful population, composed of singles and
of young couples and their children. For instance, approximately
half of the adults living on moshavim are between the ages of 18 and
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21. The settlements are therefore capable of growth both through
emigration and through the process of natural increase.
CHAPTER FOUR:
SELECTED PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT AMONG THE ARAB POPULATION
Introduction
The West Bank Arabs have also exhibited identifiable patterns
of movement. This chapter will focus primarily upon the daily move-
ment of laborers into Israel; this phenomena is of particular impor-
tance and has been termed "the most dramatic economic factor in the
entire picture since 1967 because of its great potential social
significance." The chapter will also deal with Arab emigration
and deportation.
CABINET DECISION ON ARAB LABORERS
In the summer of 1968 West Bank Arabs were granted permission
to apply for work as day-laborers in Israel. Permission was granted
for various reasons, and several important conditions were attached
to the decision.
Permission resulted in part from a desire to normalize the situ-
ation on the West Bank. Israeli leaders were natually aware that
poor economic conditions often serve to heighten unrest, and they
hoped that high rate of employment would have the opposite effect.
It has been argued that the decision was also intended to
"create such a dense network of functional ties that issues of
future sovereignty and precise political boundaries would become
2
secondary." According to this view, the resulting integration of
West Bank and Israeli economies would lead to de facto annexation
of the territory. It is doubtless that a number of Cabinet members
entertained such thoughts as the decision was being made, but it is
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only fair to add that others did not favor this scenario. They
were concerned that economic integration would lead to "de facto
incorporation of an Arab population so large that it would under-
3
mine Israel's essential Jewish majority," and were therefore un-
comfortable with the proposal.
Nonetheless the decision was made and Arab laborers, many of
whom had been unemployed prior to the occupation, poured into
Israel. Several conditions were imposed upon these laborers. They
were to enter Israel each morning and leave each evening, for they
were not allowed to reside within the state. In addition they were
required to carry identification cards and were subjected to daily
border checks. These final two conditions sometimes lead to un-
pleasant confrontations with Israeli soldiers, and are viewed as
humiliations by many Arabs.
THE NUMBER OF LABORERS
Prior to Israeli occupation, a high rate of unemployment
existed on the West Bank. It has already been noted that many
young Arabs were leaving for opportunities abroad. In 196 8 the
unemployed were presented a new option; they were allowed to remain
in the West Bank and to commute daily to Israel. During' the last
half of 1968 Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that
the number of employed Arab males fourteen and over was 70,000.
This increased sharply to 81,000 during the first half of 1969. The
16% increase was due almost entirely to the opening of job oppor-
. . . 4tumties in Israel.
.
By mid-1969 it was estimated that approximately 95,000 West
Bank Arabs were employed. (This figure includes women) . 12,800 of
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these were employed in Israel. The latter figure, however, includes
only those "legal" workers who were registered through labor ex-
change bureaus. This is significant because official Israeli sta-
tistics suggest that only 70% of the Arab workers in Israel are
5
registered. If one accepts this statistic it may be estimated
that approximately 18,000 Arabs were employed in Israel in mid-1969
Table 1 deals with the employment of West Bank Arabs. The
number of those employed in Israel represents only those who were
legally employed.
* The Israeli government makes little effort to control the in-
flux of these "illegal" workers. Many Arabs, in turn, prefer to
work "illegally." There are several reasons for this preference.
First, large numbers of Arabs are employed in the construction
sector, and work with subcontractors is often arranged informally
through relatives. An Arab who is willing to work illegally is
assured a quick assignment and almost no waiting period between
jobs; this is due to the absence of "red tape." Also, the worker
is able to retain approximately 30% of his/her income which would
be channeled into payments for social benefits if he/she were
registered. Although the worker pays no accident insurance, he/she
is secure in the knowledge that almost all Israeli employers who
hire "illegally" will cover their workers in the event of an acci-
dent on the job. The employers are not required to do so, but they
are already violating Israeli law by not paying their share of the
social tax, and many consider it cheaper and easier to provide
coverage for their laborers.
Advantages in registration include health insurance and work
compensation for accidents and lay-off periods. However, 30% of
the salary is deducted and only about 15% is returned in the form
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Columns 2, 3, 5; 19 71: Administered Territories Statistics
Quarterly
,




Columns 2, 3, 5; 1972-1977: Administered Territories Statis -
tics Quarterly
,
Volume VII, (Jerusalem: Israel Bureau of Statis-
tics, April 1978), p. 35.
Columns 2, 3, 5; 19 78, 19 79: Administered Territories Statis -
tics Quarterly
,
Volume IX, (Jerusalem: Israel Bureau of Statistics,
June 1980)
, p. 35.
This table leads to several noteworthy observations. First, the
reported declines in the number of Arabs employed in Israel were
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due partly to emigration from the West Bank. Although the total
population of the West Bank declined in number only until the be-
ginning of 1969, it is evident that the size of the labor force
also declined between 1974 and 1977. During this period Israel
experienced an economic slowdown while Jordan and the Gulf States
enjoyed rapid growth. As a result a number of workers were drawn
from the Israeli market. It is important to realize that in
periods of economic difficulty the Arabs are more readily affected
by job layoffs than are the Jews and are forced to look elsewhere.
However, among those who remained on the West Bank during those
years, the percent of unemployment never dipped beneath an impres-
sively low 1.2%.
Statistics which break down male and female employment in
Israel are unavailable, but it may be assumed that only a small
minority of the employed are female. This assumption is derived
from the following table, which has been constructed with the
aid of available information on total numbers of Arabs employed
and on total number of Arab men employed.
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Table 2
Employed West Bank Population (Age 14+, In 1000 's)
Total Total Men Total Women Men Employed Women Employed









1972 125.1 106.0 19.1
1973 126.4 107.2 19.2
1974 137.6 111.7 25.9
1975 132.4 108.5 23.9
1976 129.7 105.5 24.2
1977 127.4 104.1 23.3
1978 131.5 105.9 25.6
1979 132.8 108.8 24.0
Sources
:
Column 2: from Column 2, Table 1.
Column 3; 19 72-1977: Administered Territories Statistics
Quarterly
,





Column 3; 1978, 1979: Administered Territories Quarterly
,
Vol. IX, (Jerusalem: Israel Bureau of Statistics, June 1980), p.
35.
Columns 4, 5, 6: Derived from Columns 2 and 3.
A rapid increase in female employment is evident in the early 1970' s,
but since 1974 the number of employed females has remained fairly
stable. Women have continued to comprise less than twenty percent
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of the labor force.* The increase prior to 1974 probably reflects
the fact that women living in refugee camps, where there is no
access to farmland, were attracted by the prospect of wage labor.
Conversely, less than five percent of the rural women have joined
the labor force
.
TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKER SETTLEMENT TYPES
The Bank of Israel reports that "unskilled jobs have come to
be considered the preserve of workers from the administered areas."
The following table supports this statement.
Table 3
West Bank Arabs Employed in Israel
Total Percent in Percent Percent in Percent in
Year (1000 's) Construction in Industry Agriculture Other Sectors
1970 14.7 57.2 12.9 17.7 12.2
1971 25.6 57.0 16.8 12.9 13.3
1972 34.9 56.8 18.6 12.3 12.3
1973 38.6 56.7 20.7 8.8 13.7
1974 42.4 56.1 19.3 10.6 14.0
1975 40.4 55.0 18.6 10.9 15.5
1976 37.1 49.6 20.9 12.2 17.3
1977 35.5 44.2 22.5 12.7 20.6
*This is in spite of the fact that there is a preponderance of women
ages 15 through 44, due to the tendency of many of their male counter-
parts to emigrate. Emigration will be discussed in more detail in
the latter part of this chapter.
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Source for Table 3
Statistical Abstract of Israel




The preponderance of workers in Israel's construction sector is
evident. It is telling to note that in 19 77, construction employed
only ten percent of those Arabs who worked on the West Bank, as
opposed to forty-four percent of those in Israel. One obvious
reason for the contrast is the healthy state of Israel's construc-
tion sector. The demand for buildings managed to withstand the
recession of 1974-1978, and has maintained its momentum since.
Another reason there are large number of Arab construction workers
is that many rural Arabs wish to work in Israel and at the same
time retain possession of their farmland. They prefer jobs from
which they can be released during periods of peak labor demand on
the farm. Israel's construction sector meets the needs of these
farmers. Eighty-two percent of the Arabs employed in Israeli con-
struction are from rural areas, while the remaining eighteen per-
cent are from West Bank cities or refugee camps. This testifies to
the importance of this sector in the lives of rural Arabs.
Tables 4 and 5 deal in more detail with Arab employment in
Israel by the worker's place of residence.
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Table 4
West Bank Arabs Employed in Israel by
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Tamari, Selim, "Building Other People's Homes," Journal of
Palestine Studies (Autumn, 1981), p. 40.
Figures in brackets represent projections from small samples
Table 5
West Bank Arabs Employed in Israel by
(1) Type of Settlement and (2) Economic Sector, 1978
Settlement Total Percent in Percent in Percent in Percent in
Type (1000's) Construction Industry Agriculture Other Sectors
Cities 4.4 (27.3) (38.7) (4.5) (29.5)
Villages 28.5 48.2 21.5 12.3 18.0
Camps 3.9 (46.2) (23.1) (12.8) (17.9)
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Source for Table 5 :
Tamari, Selim, "Building Other People's Homes," Journal of
Palestine Studies (Autumn, 19 81), p. 40.
Figures in brackets represent projections from small samples.
The first table makes it evident that the great majority of
Israel's Arab laborers hail from rural areas. The second table
indicates that workers from refugee camps and from rural villages
have similar patterns of employment while those from urban areas
are more prevalent in the industrial sector.
It may be concluded that Arab laborers are concentrated in
those economic sectors which do not require highly-skilled labor.
Seventy percent of the Israeli-employed Arabs from cities, and
eighty-two percent of those from rural areas or refugee camps, are
employed in construction, industry, or agriculture. It is also
safe to conclude that an Arab's settlement type influences the sec-
tor in which he seeks employment. Generally speaking, those from
rural areas and camps are more prevalent on the construction site
whereas those from cities are most common in industry.
EMIGRATION
While many Palestinians have opted to take jobs in Israel,
others have decided to leave the West Bank and live abroad. From
1967 until 1969 emigration from the West Bank actually exceeded
the rate of natural increase. The issuance of Israeli work permits

























































Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1978 (Jerusalem:
Bureau of Statistics), p. 765.
Central
It is evident that the rate of population increase is much lower
than the rate of natural increase. The largest disparities between
the two figures existed in the years immediately following the war
and in the late 1970 's, when Israel experienced a recession. This
lends credence to the suggestion that migration has been influenced
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by economic conditions. Migration slumped when jobs opened in
Israel, and then rose in 1975 when opportunity beckoned from the
Gulf States and Jordan. As economic conditions again improved in
Israel, migration slowed. If these figures were to be extended
through the present, they would likely reflect the economic diffi-
culties which have afflicted Israel since 1980.
Most of the emigrants are young males. The result is a high
female-male ratio among many of the age groups on the West Bank.
Although Table 7 is dated, it is indicative of a trend which con-
tinues to the present.
Table 7
Males and Females by Age Group, December 19 7 3
Age Females Males Age Females Males
Total 327.4 330.0 40-44 15.0 11.2
0-4 55.6 63.0 45-49 12.6 10.1
5-9 47.2 53.1 50-54 8.8 7.9
10-14 48.0 52.9 55-59 6.8 6.3
15-19 36.2 40.3 60-64 6.1 6.1
20-24 24.2 24.2 65-69 6.0 6.1
25-29 18.9 15.1 70-74 3.4 4.7
30-34 16.9 12.0 75+ 6.0 5.8
35-39 15.4 11.2
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Source for Table 7 ;
Van Arkadie, Brian, Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies Since 1976 (N.Y.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1977), p. 56.
It was pointed out earlier that the West Bank's labor force is pre-
dominantly male and so it is not surprising that men, rather than
women, are attracted by job opportunities abroad. The table reveals
that women are a clear majority within those age groups which are
a part of the labor force.
Young men are also more likely than their female counterparts
to travel abroad seeking higher education. Those who are beckoned
by the ivory towers may or may not choose to return home upon com-
pletion of their education; however those that do return often dis-
cover they have educated themselves out of the West Bank job market.
Opportunities in Israel have, for the most part, "moved semiemployed
peasants and unemployed laborers from the territories into the
Israeli economy at the lower end of the economic scale." Meanwhile
"members of the middle economic strata of West Bank . . . society
(have) found themselves with a narrower range of economic oppor-
tunities.
. . . For the better educated Palestinians, the absence
of full-scale governmental functions limits somewhat the employ-
ment opportunities that might otherwise be available . . . ." As
a result the newly-educated often take up residence in other parts
of the world.
Large numbers of those who leave the West Bank go first to
Jordan. Jordan functions as a "temporary refuge" for many of these,
who then find work in other countries. Between 1967 and 19 72, the
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Jordanian government estimates that approximately 133,000 people
left Jordan and did not return. The "vast majority" of these were
Palestinians and while they were not all from the West Bank, the
trend is evident.
It is also evident that religious background effects an emi-
grant's choice of destination. Most Muslims tend to emigrate to
Arab states, with the majority settling in the Gulf States and
Jordan. Job opportunities draw these emigrants but so, evidently,
do religious ties. Young Arab Christians, on the contrary, often
travel to the Americas. They tend to favor the United States,
Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Peru. Often they join
entire communities of Christian Arabs which are already established
in these countries.
Large numbers of Christians have left the West Bank in recent
12years. Only about five percent of all West Bankers are Christians,
but 5000 of the 17,000 Arabs who emigrated between 1975 and 1977
were Christians. Most of these hailed from Ramallah, which is pre-
13dominantly Christian. This high emigration rate is at least
partially due to the fact that Christians make up a better-educated
and wealthier segment of West Bank society.
DEPORTATION
Not all Arabs who have left the West Bank have done so volun-
tarily. More than 600 Palestinians were deported from the West
Bank between 1967 and 1978 and, in addition to this, two entire
tribes living in the Valley were transferred to the East Bank.
Most of these deportations took place in the late 1960 's and early
1970's.
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Israeli officials place the number of deportees higher than
this. They argue, however, that many of these were infiltrators
from other Arab countries. Others, they say, chose migration as
an alternative to long prison sentences which were the result of
security offenses. They state that because choice was involved,
the offenders cannot be said to have been forcibly expelled.
These claims are challenged by some of those who have com-
piled lists of deportees, including Jordanian border officials
and various researchers . Ann Lesch states that no more than nine
deportees give places outside of Palestine as their original
15homes.* Lesch contends that, even when a degree of dishonesty
among the deportees is accounted for, the Israeli claim that 140
of the exiles were foreign infiltrators is greatly exagerrated. **
The assertion that some Arabs leave voluntarily in order to
avoid prison sentences has also been challenged. Deportees have
testified that they were "compelled to sign papers agreeing to
17their release" into another Arab country. Others say they were
told they could avoid prison only if they would "leave the country
after signing a document to the effect that they are leaving volun-
18tarily." Although a degree of choice may be involved, the
existence of accompaying Israeli pressures has also been attested
to.
* This very small number was arrived at after studying lists of all
deportees from occupied territories, rather than only those from
the West Bank, and so it may be assumed that the number for the
West Bank is smaller.




According to the Jordanian Times , the deportations are an
"Israeli effort to systematically wipe out the indigenous Pales-
19tian Arab leadership in the occupied territories." Similarly,
a United Nation's special committee to investigate Israeli prac-
tices in the territories discovered "evidence tending to show that
the inhabitants of the occupied areas are being deprived of leader-
ship by the deportation or detention of a considerable number of
21those persons looked upon by the inhabitants as their leaders."
Compiled lists of deportees include the names of lawyers, judges,
doctors, teachers, mayors, and religious leaders.
This practice also "deters the growth of an alternative, .
natural and open political leadership that could express the poli-
22tical rights and aspirations" of West Bank Arabs. It is a fairly
effective deterrent because fear of deportation quiets resistence.
Indeed, various West Bank leaders cite exile as one of their
greatest fears.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine patterns of
population movement and settlements in the West Bank since its
occupation in 1967, and to identify the factors causing the ob-
served patterns. Selected patterns have included the establishment
of Jewish settlements, the daily flow of Arab laborers into Israel,
and the voluntary and involuntary out-migxation of Arabs. Patterns
of Jewish settlement were the primary focus; because of the contro-
versial nature of the settlements, this emphasis was deemed justi-
fiable. It is hoped that the research might shed light on this
volatile issue.
KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter Two
The second chapter of the thesis dealt with placement of
Isareli settlements and focused on governmental decision-making.
The Cabinet of the Knesset has played a major role in determining
location. It has born the responsibility of deciding which areas
are of high priority for settlement and although consensus has not
always been easy to attain, clear-cut patterns emerged under both
Labour (1967-1977) and Likud ( 1977-present)
.
Under Labour, emphasis was placed upon settlement in the Jordan
Valley. During this period the densely-populated highlands were
left virtually untouched. They were avoided for demographic
reasons in that Labour's leaders balked at settlement among a large
Arab population. They realized that annexation of the entire West
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Bank would mean Israel would eventually be characterized by an
Arab majority, which was not acceptable. According to the tenets
of Zionism, the Jewish state must maintain its Jewish majority.
Therefore Labour favored settlement (and eventual annexation) only
of the sparcely populated Jordan Valley. These settlements would
be of value defensively and would pose no threat to the ethnic
character of the state.
Under the leadership of Likud this policy was altered. Likud
was influenced by a body of thought which held that Jews must set-
tle the highlands of Judea and Samaria. These had been the heart-
land of ancient Israel; therefore twentieth-century Israel was
justified—indeed, even obligated—in settling them again. The
territory had been given them by God and could not be rightfully
claimed by its Arab occupants. Likud adopted this view and has
consistently emphasized the need to establish settlements around
and between Arab centers of population in the highlands.
While the Cabinet has successfully determined the general
thrust of settlement, it has nonetheless faced stiff Jewish resis-
tence from time to time. Labour and Likud have both been forced
to deal with groups of settlers who chose to settle in unauthorized
areas and who proceeded to do so without approval. Labour initially
reacted to such threats by forcibly removing the settlers; it then
responded with compromise in the case of Kiryat 'Arba; and finally
it simply allowed three highland settlements to remain in place,
unchallenged and unapproved. After Likud took office, it was faced
with a group of settlers who had moved right into the Arab city of
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Hebron. This action was eventually approved, albeit with consider-
able discomfort.
Today there are few barriers to Jewish settlement of the West
Bank. Even Arab possession of land has not been an insurmountable
barrier. The final section of chapter two dealt with how land has
been obtained for settlement. It discusses in some detail the
difficulty in defining "privately owned land." This difficulty
arises because most of the West Bank was unsurveyed prior to occupa-
tion, and so many Arabs do not hold clear title. Such land is often
claimed by Israel. By some estimates—and all estimates depend
greatly upon how "private land" is defined by the researcher—over
ninety percent of the land claimed by Israel had previously been
privately owned by Arabs.
Chapter Three
Chapter three dealt with the settlers themselves. Available
information was less abundant for this topic of research, but a
number of findings and conclusions were possible.
First, certain criteria have been established and must be
satisfied by any group of prospective settlers which wishes to
gain governmental approval. These criteria particularly emphasize
the need for a defined social topic, self-labor, and joint owner-
ship .
Perhaps the easiest of these to satisfy is the demand for a
defined social topic. Most settler groups recruit members based on
homogeneous religious beliefs and social values. The demand for
joint ownership is also rather easy to satisfy, although by
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definition the different Settlement Movements satisfy it to vary-
ing degrees. For example, there are three collective agriculture
Settlement Movements. These are the kibbutzim, the moshavim, and
the moshav shitufi'im. The kibbutzim most nearly approach a state
of socialism; there is no private property and families live com-
munally. On the moshav shitufi'im farming is done collectively
and profits are shared, but families live in separate households.
And on the moshavim, individuals own both homes and farms, although
equipment is used cooperatively and produce is marketed jointly.
These differences in the degree of joint ownership play a role in
determining the sort of people these settlements attract. The
kibbutzim appeal mostly to young socialist immigrants from Europe,
while the moshavim have a much broader appeal and thus are found
in greater number in the West Bank.
The last of the emphasized criteria, the demand for self-
labor, is breaking down even on the kibbutzim. This is apparently
a situation which government officials are able to overlook in the
face of increased settlement production and the perceived need for
Arab laborers, but the requirement nevertheless remains "on the
books .
"
Chapter three also touched on settler choices of location.
The settlers usually make a decision within the broader context
of priorities established by the Cabinet, but on a smaller scale
they are influenced by factors such as quality of the land and its
intended utilization, strategic and historic significance, and
the location of Arab population.
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A settlement group may form in Israel or abroad, and its
members may or may not be of homogeneous origin. Common religious
beliefs and social values seem to play the vital role in cementing
a group together. Also, those who choose to settle the West Bank
seem to be drawn, at a basic level, by either a religious conviction
in Israel's "divine right" to the land or by a more secular concern
for the maintenance of Israel's "military and historical integrity."
These two views are very different and, again, Israelis will tend
to settle with those who believe as they do.
Chapter three also discussed the economic bases of the settle-
ments. In most cases the settlements do possess viable bases. In
the Valley agriculture dominates, although there is a degree of
small industry. In the highlands, where cultivatable land is not
so readily available, the economic picture is more diverse. Set-
tlements are supported by factories, schools, or the provision of
services. Military posts have been founded and so too have several
"bedroom communities" for the city of Jerusalem. Also, groups of
settlements have banded together to own and jointly operate indus-
tiral parks.
Finally, the chapter dealt with settler numbers. Very few
conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. It can be said only
that most adults are at the peak of the child-bearing years, and
that a majority of the West Bank's Jews are children. There is
no consensus on the total number of settlers. Estimates made in
1980 and in early 1981 ranged from 5,000 to 18,000.
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Chapter Four
Chapter four focused upon patterns of movement displayed by
the Arab population. Three identifiable patterns were discussed.
The first of these was the daily movement of Arab laborers
into Israel. In the summer of 1968 the Cabinet granted Arabs
permission to work in Israel (though not to live in Israel) , and
the results of this decision have been termed "the most dramatic
economic factor in the entire picture since 1967. A high rate of
unemployment had existed on the West Bank prior to occupation,
but by 1971 unemployment was very nearly nonexistent. The unemploy-
ment rate at that time was 2.8% and it continued to decline in
following years. During the 19 70's, 44-57 percent of those Arabs
employed in Israel were construction workers, and the majority
hailed from rural areas. As might be expected, most were male.
Despite the very low rates of unemployment, emigration from
the West Bank rose markedly during periods of economic slowdown in
Israel. (Conversely emigration slowed when Israel's economy
improved.) Most emigrants have been young males, and most have
sought work in Jordan or in the Gulf States.
While some West Bankers emigrate in search of jobs others leave
in pursuit of higher education. Often they overqualify themselves
for work at home and do not return. Most of these are also young
men, which contributes to the high female/male ratio among many of
the West Bank's age groups.
The chapter also dealt briefly with deportation. Most depor-
tations took place in the late 1960 's and early 1970's, and Arabs
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and Israelis differ on the motives behind this practice. Israelis
claim that most deportees were infiltrators from Arab countries
and did not belong on the West Bank. Others were criminals who
chose to leave Israel rather than serve out prison sentences.
Arabs, on the other hand, argue that expulsion is an effort to
"systematically wipe out the indigenous Palestinian Arab leader-
2
ship." This perception has resulted in a fear of eventual deporta-
tion among the West Bank's more vocal leadership, and it serves
to subdue some of the voices of discontent.
RESEARCH CONSTRAINTS
I was confronted with a number of research constraints during
construction of the thesis. The most disturbing of these was an
inability to find information concerning the movement of Arabs who
have lost land to the Israelis. It would be reasonable to assume
that some of these lost land and retained homes, and thus opted
for employment in Israel. Others have probably moved to West Bank
urban centers or have migrated to the East Bank and abroad. How-
ever, I was unable to find any information on these patterns of
movement or on the intensity of the same.
Another constraint concerned the lack of statistical data on
the Jewish settlers. It would have been interesting to compare
the characteristics of the settlers with those of Israel's Jewish
population, but my sources did not differentiate between the two.
Statistics on settler origin, age structure, male/female ratio,
education level, and employment would have been valuable but were
unavailable. There was also no consensus concerning the number of
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settlers. This fact served as a reminder that much of my source
material displayed an evident bias. In most cases interpretations
rather than facts differed, but in this particular case the dis-
crepancies were glaring, and I was able to draw no conclusions.*
Finally, I was disappointed that I could not find more infor-
mation on the evolution of settlement types. For example, a set-
tlement may begin as a Nahal and become a kibbutz, and then even-
tually join the moshav Movement. The trends in settlement type
would have been interesting and revealing but again, information on
settlements was difficult to find, was often badly dated, and was
rarely comprehensive.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER" RESEARCH
As research for this thesis progressed, a number of topics
emerged which seem to be worthy of further study. Most of these
would be most easily developed through on-site research or through
the use of questionnaires; the methodology I employed would not
be sufficient.
I was particularly interested in those variables which moti-
vate Jews to settle on the West Bank. My sources dealt with this
question only in passing, and they then tended to lump the explana-
tion into terminology such as "religion" and "nationalism." There
* The problem of research bias has been mentioned and should be ela-
borated upon. It is of course almost impossible for a scholar
to eliminate bias from his/her writings. This is perhaps parti-
cularly true when the topic is intensely controversial as is
the West Bank. However, I do not feel that source bias was a
major constraint. Most of the researchers made a sincere attempt
to avoid propaganda, and often they presented opposing views for
the reader's consideration. When opposing views could not be
found within a single source, they could generally be found in
a comparison of sources
.
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was little or no mention of economic factors, occupational factors,
Jewish perceptions of life in the occupied territories, and a host
of additional factors which may or may not play roles in the
decision-making process. I believe this would be a worthwhile
study
.
It would be interesting to explore Arab emigration from the
West Bank, again in terms of the decision-making process. Such a
study might focus on why the decision to leave is made, and on how
a destination is selected.
A study concerning Arab working conditions in Israel might
also be of benefit. Topics such as relations with Jewish manage-
ment, degree of integration into the surrounding environment,
wages, and extent of underemployment would be worth exploring.
A researcher might also concern himself with changes in Arab
settlement patterns. Because there has been an influx of Jewish
settlers, and because in many cases Arab lands have been taken to
accommodate these settlers, it seems reasonable to assume Arab
settlement patterns have undergone many changes which were not
discussed in this thesis. Unfortunately I was able to find no
information on this, and I feel this dearth should be corrected.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the trends which have
been elucidated in the thesis are ongoing trends, and will continue
to be worth researching in the future.
Today much of the world sees the tiny West Bank as a timebomb,
tightly wound and replete with the danger of havoc and destruction.
Entire novels have been written about the hypothetical international
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repercussions of the settlements. The evening news occasionally
brings us reels of riots and death in the territory. Peace plans
continue to be drafted, and they continue to be rejected. Indeed,
the menace to stability seems quite real.
Meanwhile Israeli settlement proceeds unabated. Most of the
international community opposes it, and the U.N. never tires of
demanding withdrawal, but little impact seems to be made by the
barrage of words. If anything Israel is hardened by the estrange-
ment.
In 1982 Israel relinquished the Sinai and annexed the Golan
Heights. After annexation of the Golan Heights a number of onlook-
ers suggested the West Bank would soon follow. The careful observer,
however, should weigh predictions of annexation against a basic
Israeli dilemma voiced by Abba Eban shortly after occupation.
He said:
If the West Bank and Gaza Arabs were annexed, our principles
would not allow us to withhold citizenship—and our vital
interests would not allow us to grant it.
It is common knowledge that annexation would enrage most the world,
but often it is forgotten that it would frighten large numbers of
Israelis as well. When the future of the West Bank is discussed,
this variable should not be ignored. Under the present set of cir-
cumstances it seems that it is not to Israel's advantage to annex.
And in reality, legal annexation hardly seems necessary. Israel's
government has discovered the considerable advantages of de facto
annexation; Arabs need not be granted the rights of citizenship,
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and settlers can maintain their flow into "Judea" and "Samaria."
In the future, I believe that settlement will continue to focus
upon the highlands and that the Jewish population of the territory
will increase markedly. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that the
process of de facto annexation will be reversed by any of those
who wish to avoid spilling of blood in doing so.
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine selected patterns
of settlement, population movement in the West Bank since its
occupation in 1967. These patterns include the establishment of
Jewish settlements, the voluntary and involuntary out-migration
of Arabs, and the daily flow of Arab labor into Israel. The re-
search is a response to a preceived need for a better understand-
ing of this highly controversial part of the world. The patterns
represent vital human factors which must be accounted for by anyone
wishing to deal with the divisive issues of occupation.
Data for the thesis was gathered through a review of relevant
statistical information and of books, periodicals and newspapers.
The study area includes all the West Bank with the exception of
East Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel in June of 1967.
The sources made it clear that the Israeli Cabinet plays the
primary role in determining patterns of Jewish settlement. Chap-
ter 2 describes the decisions made by that body and attempts to
define the more important variables which have played into the
decision-making process. In general it may be stated that demo-
graphic and strategic factors were dominant in decision-making
within the Labour coalition (1967-1977), and that religious and
historical factors have dominated under Likud ( 1977-present) . The
resultant patterns of settlement reflect these differences.
The third chapter discusses the Jewish settlers. Prospective
settlement groups are organized in Israel or abroad and must then
gain government approval. This involves satisfying established
criteria, such as the development of a defined social topic and
support of principles such as self-labor and joint ownership.
Most settlement groups easily satisfy the first requirement, be-
cause members are knit together by common religious beliefs and
social values. The principles of self-labor and joint ownership,
however, are unequally embraced from settlement to settlement.
Generally speaking, the kibbutzim more nearly approach a state of
socialism than do the more plentiful moshavim.
Chapter 3 also deals with settler choices of location, which
are made within the broader context of the government priorities
discussed .in Chapter 2. It discusses the economic bases of the
settlements, and concludes that most are viable. In addition, it
is concluded that most settlers who are drawn to the West Bank are
attracted less by economic factors than by strongly-held beliefs,
such as Israel's "divine right" to the land or a concern for
Israeli security.
The fourth chapter deals with the movement of Arabs. The most
notable pattern has been the daily flow of laborers into Israel.
Most of these laborers are employed in construction, are from rural
areas, and are males.
Although a very significant number of Arabs are employed in
Israel, others choose to emigrate in search of work. They are
particularly attracted to the lively economies of Jordan and the
Gulf States. And finally, a small number of West Bankers have been
forcibly expelled. Although their number is small, Arabs claim
the losses are disproportionately large. They say this practice
is systematically depriving them of effective leadership.
In conclusion, I feel the research has been worthwhile. Al-
though I had originally hoped to include a discussion on changes
in Arab settlement patterns and was unable to find the information,
the study as a whole has been an excellent learning experience.
Unfortunately the research convinced me that the period in
time when Israel might have compromised on the West Bank belongs
now to history, and that a complete "de facto" annexation is un-
avoidable .
i
